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Constitutional design of the post – 1945 liberal
consensus
When is the constitutional design of any (domestic, international, supranational)
polity in error? On the most general level such critical juncture obtains when
polity’s founding document (treaty, convention, constitution) protects against the
dangers that no longer exist or does not protect against the dangers that were not
contemplated by the Founders. While discussion of the evolution of human rights
and international actors in response to social change (LGBT, euthanasia, abortion)
is well documented, such evolution with regard to political change (transition from
one sort of government to another) is less well documented. Constitutions not
only constitute but should also protect against de-constitution. For supranational
legal order to avoid a deadlock of „being in error” in the above sense, the systemic
threats coming from within the polity’s component parts must be recognised and
constitutional design be changed accordingly.
The term “democratic backsliding” is understood as “the process through which
elected public authorities deliberately implement governmental blueprints which aim
to systematically weaken, annihilate or capture internal checks on power with the
view of dismantling the liberal democratic state and entrenching the long-term rule
of the dominant party”. It highlights the errors in the design of the supranational legal
order – the European Union. Although the European Union has faced many crises
in recent years, including BREXIT and the euro crisis, the democratic backsliding in
some of its Member States, is the most serious of all. The backsliders have trampled
upon the values of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. In doing so, they
have called into question the very foundations of European integration and have
undermined the European project from within. As such the “democratic backsliding”
undermines European post – war liberal consensus which has been built around the
paradigm of „never again constitutionalism” and has been reinforced by the legal
commitment of the states to make sure that dictatorships would never again arise
out of constitutionalism. Political power at the domestic level was to become subject
to new international and supranational checks and balances with the legitimacy of
the power depending on the continuous adherence to the core values of liberalism,
values that transcend the desires of the moment. Human rights and institutions (eg.
courts) were given special place in this system of international and supranational
checks and constraints imposed on the domestic pouvoir constituant. Yet, they were
never meant to be alone.
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The states themselves have recognised that the human rights would work best
alongside three complementary safe-guards: i) rule of law and the constitution as
the supreme law of the land binding on both the political power and the people; ii).
mechanisms of supranational and international control whereby self-governing and
sovereign states would hold each other to account according to principles of human
rights, guarantees of democracy and openness to the world. iii). trust in the binding
power of law that would commit the states to the discipline of community. All this
underpinned by the suspicion of sovereignty. The trust has always been built on
the convergence between the fundamental values of Member States and their legal
orders on the one hand, and the foundations of the Union legal order, on the other.
Indeed, as P. Pescatore, emphasised the supranationality was predicated on the
idea of “an order determined by the existence of common values and interests” (The
Law of Integration. Emergence of a new phenomenon in international relations
based on the experience of the European Communities (Sijthoff, Leiden, 1974).
At the heart of the European project has been a fundamental commitment to a set
of First Principles (term borrowed from D. Edward, An Appeal to First Principles,
unpublished manuscript on file with the Author) that the Member States, institutions,
and civil society actors bound by the Treaties agree to respect and live by in their
mutual dealings. The rule of law has been among the most essential of these First
Principles essential to the post-war consensus as it started transforming “a political
power” into “political power constrained by law”.
And yet despite all this talk of hope and learning from the past, the EU constitutional
system and design have been always in error of “normative asymmetry”:
declarations and commitments have never been backed up with the sufficient
enforcement tool-kit. Why? Back in 1951 the authority to ensure that states remain
liberal democracies has not been effectively translated into law which might have
been understandable given the fresh memories of horrors wrought upon the
continent by II World War. The Founding Fathers must have taken for granted
that these memories would always act as a sufficient deterrent against any future
backsliding into authoritarianism. History never stops, though, it always moves and
today the once unthinkable (an illiberal state within the Union) challenges the EU
design. The failure of the EU enforcement in Hungary and now in Poland was clear
on display: the EU has been always one step behind the events on the ground, lost
in endless and ineffective diplomacy of indignation. The states which are the source
of a distrust and fear have been called on to sit at trial over one of their fellow (and
now backsliding) member states. The European institutions faced dangers they
were not prepared and then also contributed to the crisis by their own incompetence
and lack of political will. As a result, there was no coordinated systemic action.
The capture marched on emboldened and strengthened by the lack of credible
supranational counter-strategies.
Rethinking the constitutional design. What’s in a
name?
The democratic backsliding is not just another crisis of governance. Rather it strikes
at the very core of the initial bargain that brought states together. The backsliding
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changes a constitutional profile of component parts of the Union. The states not
only fail to respect the First Principles but become „different states” in terms of
their constitutional fabric. It comes with the constitutional narrative of capturing
  the domestic, and rejecting international and supranational, institutions. The
constitutional capture stands for a systemic weakening of checks and balances
and entrenching power by making future changes in power difficult. It is power-
entrenching mechanism that has in-built spill-over effect and, as such, the potential
of Europe – wide adverse consequences.
This is where the challenge of rethinking the constitutional design of the EU comes
to the fore.  Rethinking requires revisiting the substance of the EU membership by
engaging with the new kind of regimes within the EU and asking what it means to
be a member state of the EU in the XXI century. The language and perspectives
through which the EU looks at its Member States must be challenged and changed.
Member States must be invested in the legal order and the integration project
by repeated acknowledgement that they want to respect the understanding of
the EU legality and its First Principles that brought them together. The states
must speak with one voice that they are ready to defer to the common institutions
enforcing these Principles in the name of the community. This commitment would
then translate into more technical aspect of the tools (“how”) and build a remedial
framework for the systemic and holistic response to the democratic backsliding.
The “Essential characteristics of the EU law” (term used by the Court of Justice
in its Opinion 2/13, para 167), must go today beyond traditional “First Principles”
of supremacy and direct effect, and instead embrace the rule of law, separation
of powers, independence of the judiciary and enforceability of these principles
as integral part of the ever – evolving EU legality. Together these essential
characteristics of EU law have given rise to what the Court has imaginatively called:
„a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations
linking the EU and its Member States, and its Member States with each other, which
are now engaged, as is recalled in the second paragraph of Article 1 TEU, in a
‘process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. The rule of
law, integrity of the legal system and judicial independence are the core principles of
the original consensus that brought member states together. The novel part of the
argument would be to make art. 19 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in
conjunction with art. 2 TEU (enumerating the values on which the EU is based) the
cornerstone of the EU legality. While the “existential jurisprudence” at the service of
the EU legality calls for the imaginative and engaged interpretation from the courts, it
would never work in isolation. The courtroom alone might achieve only so much. Its
full impact will only be realised when the political institutions exhibit the readiness to
complement the existential jurisprudence with their own expertise and enforcement
of the First Principles. For the Court to effectively exert its judicialization effect on
the EU governance, it must be backed up by the political branches of the EU. As a
result, the litigation strategies of the European Commission must now respond to the
ongoing shift in the courtroom by framing arguments against the background of “the
law” (art. 19 TEU) and the existential jurisprudence.
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The rethinking would invite constitutional lawyers to move beyond dangerously
over – inclusive and nebulous “populism talk” and instead focus on, and deal with,
the constitutional features of the emerging populist constitutional doctrine that
challenges the basic underpinnings of the liberal constitutionalism and calls into
question the standard origin story of the EU. The contours of this new doctrine/
tradition revolve around few basic tenets. The politics rather than being tamed and
constrained by law, are increasingly seen as the threat to the constitution. The
constitutions are no longer seen as shields against the state, rather they protect the
uniqueness of the state and nation understood in ethno-cultural terms. Constitutional
courts are transformed from counter – majoritarian institutions to government
enablers, rule of law becomes rule by law, checks and balances are frowned upon
as liberal inventions serving the few etc.
However, rethinking calls for more than retooling the legal register. When dealing
with the democratic backsliding, one has to avoid danger of being trapped in the
world of legal expertise and arcane legalistic approaches to the current crisis.
The question “how” the EU constitutional design should be adapted must go hand
in hand with revisiting the “why” question. In other words: Changing the ailing
constitutional design of the EU in the name of Whom?
Rethinking as going beyond lawyers’ heads
As rightly commented by D. Edward  “[…] our endless discussion of How has
caused us to lose sight of Why” The problem with the EU – wide response to the
democratic backsliding from within boils down to not so much the lack of common
point of reference, but rather to the lack of understanding among People’s of Europe
why and how the quality of democracy and the rule of law in one of the member
states should matter to them. EU needs build trust not only in the its member states’
adherence to democratic values and the rule of law, but first and foremost, construct
a civic narrative and loyalty to these allegedly shared values. As long as that does
not happen, even most ambitious legal proposals for the rule of oversight in the
EU will founder on the sands of lack of democratisation and apolitical ethos of the
European polity, leaving the citizens with the hopeless feeling that this is yet another
debate for afficionados. Therefore, the EU must be able to defend the narrative and
explain at the domestic level not only what and how the EU is “doing things”, but also
why it acts to defend voluntary commitments and duties adopted by the states on the
Accession. Europe needs its own voice and counter-narrative in defense of the rule
of law that would be heard in the national capitals.
These intangibles go well beyond the (important no doubt) talk of procedures,
paragraphs, new institutions etc. They ask questions about the political will and
imagination, readiness and, yes also political courage, to stand up for, and defend,
the common project against the domestic idiosyncrasies, fleeting voters’ preferences
and electorates. True debate about the rule of law oversight needs these intangibles
just as much as strong legal mechanisms. As things stand right now, domestic rule
of law and independence of courts are of no concern to Dutch, French etc. people.
Without such recalibration of our perspectives and loyalties, rule of law oversight is
doomed to be no more than a patching-up process, here and there, rather than much
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needed global and principled approach that would look to the causes, not simply
cure the symptoms.
Therefore the challenge of rethinking the EU constitutional design today faced with
the democratic backsliding from within must be based on two existential pillars: (I)
Member states must be invested in the legal order and the integration project by
repeated acknowledgement that they want to respect the values that brought them
together and that they are ready to share these values with others; this will then
translate into more technical aspect of the tools („how”); (II) society of citizens must
feel fidelity to values that truly define them as Europeans, rather than mere decorum
belonging as a result of their member states accession. Only the sum of (I) and (II)
can ensure long-lasting success. We knew for years now that (II) has been missing
since the inception of the European project and that the civic register has never
been really activated. Unfortunately as of now „the ever closer union” continues to
be bound together by the fact of statal membership with the citizens still lurking in
the shadow (despite valiant rhetoric to the contrary from the Court of Justice) of this
state – driven narrative. The Union continues to be a Union of states and at best
market – driven and self -interested economic operators. Without (I) and (II), the
EU’s rule of law suffers from existential drawbacks. While the EU should continue
its efforts to secure observance to the rule of law, it must at the same time show
more readiness for critical rethinking of its current mandate and limitations in the rule
of law department, and more broadly constitutional design. At some point, Treaty
changes might be indeed needed to reflect the (un)constitutional change within the
polity.  The challenge of responding to the backsliding and the ensuing change in
the constitutional fabric of the Union goes clearly beyond institutional and procedural
dimension. Have we managed to move beyond ad hoc patching – up of the sinking
ship, and onto more systemic rethinking of the system’s ailments? I think so far, we
have not. The crucial „moral authority for a claim to obedience to the Rule of Law” is
still missing. As long as the union of states does not make a leap towards community
of values shared and enforced in the name of the European peoples, rule of law
crises are here to stay with us. Indeed J. Weiler’s warning should be heeded: the EU
„should simultaneously hurry up and put its own democratic house in order lest it be
reminded again that those living in glass houses should be careful when throwing
stones” (J. H. H. Weiler, Epilogue: Living in a Glass House: Europe, Democracy
and the Rule of Law, in C. Closa, D. Kochenov, (eds.,), Reinforcing Rule of Law
Oversight in the European Union, (Cambridge University Press, 2016), at p. 325 –
326).
The rethinking I am talking about here thus calls on appreciating the interaction
between the legal dimension of the integration (search for optimal tools and
enforcement competences to safeguard the EU legality) and its ethical face
(narrative and justification that would explain in the name of whom the EU
legality is defended). Only the sum of I (commitment of the member states) and II
(constitutional design) and III (triggering the civic register) can ensure long-lasting
credibility and legitimacy of the EU legality. In the end, discussion of unconstitutional
domestic change, the supranational resilience and design, must weave together high
hopes, concerns, and yes, also disappointments, healthy skepticism and political
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constraints. The latter must be as much part of our rethinking the changing fabric of
the European liberal consensus and the ways forward, as the former.
With such recalibration and necessary pragmatism, it will become obvious that
the assumptions that reigned supreme not long time ago must no longer be taken
for granted today. Rather the democratic backsliding must force political leaders
and constitutional lawyers alike into asking uneasy questions: Is the EU really a
celebration of liberal democracy? Are the values still shared by all parties to the
original bargain? Does the authority of law and respect for the law continue to bind
the states together? Is the Court of Justice still considered one court for all the
member states? To what extent is the mutual trust the backbone of the legal system
of the EU? Is the democratic consolidation in the post-post-communist states really
irrevocable and linear? These questions are as dramatic as the crisis that brought
them to the forefront of the European legal discourse. Only asking them and then
taking the uncomfortable answers seriously, will give the EU constitutional design a
new lease of life.
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